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Introduction 
The publication of this special issue is timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957 by France and its five fellow founder 
members of the European Economic Community (EEC).1  The Treaty of Rome 
committed France to integrate its economy ever more comprehensively with those of 
its fellow member states. If Parsons is to be believed (2017), by far the majority of 
French organised interests at the time (political, economic, industrial, administrative, 
diplomatic) were just as resistant to this development as they had been to the 1951 
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and the 
European Defence and Political Communities (EDC and EPC) in 1954.  
In this interpretation of history, a minority of French politicians carried the day in 
1957 by virtue of luck and a constellation of circumstances, just as they had done in 
1951 (and would do in later years at similar critical moments), whereas in 1954 these 
factors did not line up: former Prime Minister Georges Bidault had argued in the 
parliamentary debates on the European Defence Community in 1953 that building 
Europe could not come at the price of unmaking France or its empire (then, the Union 
française); il faut faire l’Europe, Bidault argued, sans défaire l’Union française2.  
In contrast, the Treaty of Rome set up terms of engagement over which France had 
driven a hard bargain, which appeared unthreatening to national autonomy, and 
which survived the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics in 1958.  On the 
eve of the 2017 French presidential elections, our empirically-rich collection of 
articles returns to those early years and to the 60 years since to inform our reflection 
on the state of France’s EU membership today.  Collectively, we assess how and why 
Europe matters in our understanding of contemporary France, and we seek to situate 
our findings in the ongoing research agendas for the study of France and the 
European Union.                                                          
1 Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and West Germany. 
2 See G. Bossuat (2006), Faire l’Europe sans défaire la France. 60 ans de politique d’unité européenne 
des gouvernements et des présidents de la République française (1943-2003) (Brussels, Peter Lang).  
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Specifically, it would appear that studies of Europeanisation as an independent 
variable of change have in the case of France reached something of a dead-end; or 
rather, from one reading of Parson’s meta-review of recent literatures, reflect a 
‘distressing’ stalemate in the reality of French politics, a ‘national inertia’ 
characterised by the ‘resilience of the French party system and institutions’ (2017: 
599) and where ‘French people have difficulty connecting their views on Europe to 
choices of representatives, and the only clear party positions on Europe come from 
extremists’ (ibid, 598).  
Presidents and parties 
Our contributors bring nuance to this picture. With regards to the presidency, and 
specifically the presidential elections of 2012, Reynolds’ reading of the campaigns 
leads him to conclude that the question of Europe was clear and present, despite 
appearances to the contrary; it was, he argues, the elephant in the room finally 
revealed in all its bulk and immutability. President Sarkozy’s response to the world 
financial and economic crisis of 2008 onwards and his enactment of the 2008 French 
presidency of the EU’s Council of Ministers were the primary sources of this salience.  
In matter of fact, French presidential candidates throughout the Fifth Republic have 
all used presidential elections as occasions to solemnly and emphatically reaffirm 
their commitment to Europe, and the 2012 elections were no exception to the rule, 
certainly on the part of the mainstream candidates of right (Nicolas Sarkozy) and left 
(François Hollande).  Moreover, French presidents routinely claim that they make no 
distinction between the national and European levels of governance, supporting 
Robert Ladrech’s depiction of Europeanisation, coined as far back as 1994, as ‘an 
incremental process reorientating the direction and shape of politics to the degree 
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of 
national politics and policy-making’ (Ladrech, 1994: 69, our emphasis).   
So perhaps ‘salient’ is the wrong term to depict an issue that at presidential election 
time is both everywhere – as an ‘organizational logic’; and nowhere – as a distinct 
political cleavage (Drake, 2013). Behind this picture are France’s parties of 
government which have been disturbed but not transformed by the addition of a 
European layer of governance in the Fifth Republic.  Specifically, they have by and 
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large eschewed any extensive revision of their ideological and ideational foundations. 
Parsons draws a direct line from the early days of the European Community to the 
present time in this regard, noting that ‘…[t]he fragmentation that so confused French 
debates over the early communities, with parties struggling to digest or stifle 
European dilemmas, still troubles the relationship (Parsons, 2017: 597). 
In this collection, David Hanley for the French Socialist Party (PS) and Ben Leruth and 
Nick Startin for the ‘Gaullist movement’ – the mainstream right – arrive at broadly 
similar conclusions.  Hanley returns to three key historical moments in the life of the 
intra-party management of the PS: the late 1950s (‘joining the EEC and its immediate 
aftermath’); the 1983 policy U-turn of President François Mitterrand; and the 
presidency of François Hollande with specific reference to the eurozone crisis. Taken 
together, Hanley finds strong evidence of continuity in the party’s behaviour over the 
European issue; namely, that Europe was an ‘active resource’ for party management 
to impose unity, even at the cost of shedding ‘disgruntled activists’, but that over time 
this – holding a pro-EU line in the face of internal opposition - has come at serious 
cost to the party’s inner strength (and electoral popularity). Unity was relatively easy 
to achieve in the case of the EEC: in comparison with the fissiparious impact on the 
party of the EDC in 1954 and, above all, of the Algerian war, there was much to agree 
over in the Treaty of Rome. In 1983, Mitterrand’s choices to forge ahead with 
European integration in the face of opposition within the party cost him some 
dissidents, entrenched fault lines within the party and also distinguished it from the 
French Communist Party (PCF), but simultaneously bolstered his power as President 
of the Republic. François Hollande, faced with the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis on 
coming to power in 2012 was similarly able to exert presidential power to marginalise 
dissenting voices in the PS on the question of macro-economic policy manoeuvre vis-
à-vis the EU. However, the party entered the 2017 presidential elections seriously 
weakened: President Hollande declined to run for a second term in an unprecedented 
admission of weakness; incumbent Prime Minister Valls fell casualty to the party 
primaries which saw Benoît Hamon emerge from the left of the party as official 
presidential candidate; and former government minister Emmanuel Macron 
established his own movement and presidential platform, En Marche! 
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On the right, Leruth and Startin show how the Gaullist legacy in European matters is 
also far from settled, and how it fragments support for the mainstream right. De 
Gaulle when president pursued a complex strategy towards la construction 
européenne, and so it is not surprising that his legacy is contested, meaning different 
things at different times to different people. Leruth and Startin do classify the legacy 
into three strands of Gaullist thought on Europe –federal, pragmatic and populist – 
and conclude that the Gaullist movement returns to the populist, souverainiste 
version like a moth to a flame, with the 2017 presidential elections so far conforming 
to type, confirming that at this time, ‘the movement has failed to forge a coherent, 
common stance on Europe’.  Here too we can ask whether this fragmentation is 
functional, in so far as this conservatism preserves differentials between individuals 
and their careers, and holds out the permanent hope of triumph over one’s rivals. If 
so and as with the PS, such a strategy comes at a cost, namely the opening of space 
for rival parties and movements with clearer messages on Europe; here, the National 
Front and its 2017 presidential election programme proposal for systematically 
reclaiming, from the EU, French legal, monetary, economic, and political sovereignty.3 
Policies and ideas 
Howarth and Schild provide a complementary perspective on how the obduracy of 
French ideas on Europe has come at a high price, in this case, the loss of power 
relative to Germany, and an effective loss of economic autonomy in macro-economic 
policy making to the point where the Economist Intelligence Unit in December 2011 
branded French democracy ‘flawed’, specifically for the ‘erosion of sovereignty and 
democratic accountability associated with the effects of and responses to the 
eurozone crisis’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011).  In their article for this collection, 
the authors trace the stability of French preferences in monetary policy since the late 
1940s (with the exception of the 1958-1969 de Gaulle decade). This stability takes the 
form of consistent support for ‘European-level mechanisms for balance of payments 
support’. In the current day, this amounts to a Keynsian belief that both debtor and 
creditor countries in the Eurozone should share responsibility for adjustments in                                                         
3 For detail, see https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-presidentiel-marine-
le-pen.pdf  
 5 
order to reduce macro-economic imbalances between participating countries, and as 
predicated in the post-war, Bretton Woods system of ‘embedded liberalism’.  This is a 
policy line that runs counter to German ordo-liberalism thinking (a preference for 
macro-economic convergence (to the creditor country norm) and supranational 
governance of macro-economic, fiscal policy) which has, time and time again, won 
out in the battle of ideas with France, despite the contributions of several significant 
and influential French figures (Robert Marjolin, Georges Pompidou, Jean-Pierre 
Fourcade, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Raymond Barre, Pierre Bérégovoy) to the debate 
over the decades.  Howarth and Schild argue that the Eurozone crisis did provide 
French leaders with a ‘window of opportunity’ to further their preferences, and that 
they had some limited success, but overall were capped by ‘German hostility’ to 
proposals such as Hollande’s call for ‘the mutualization of public debt through the 
introduction of Eurobonds’.  Howarth and Schild’s carefully traced account ‘from the 
Treaty of Rome to the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis’ reveals very clearly how the 
Franco-German relationship functions as a self-regulating system of push and pull, 
give and take, where the interplay is determined as much by ideational difference as 
by diverging material interests. They conclude that the red line that France will not 
cross – to relinquish further autonomy in fiscal matters – has ‘left the euro area in a 
dangerous in-between-territory’; and it has also left the French mainstream 
vulnerable to political attacks on the price it has paid over the years with regards to 
the battle of macro-economic ideas with its partner Germany. 
Megan Brown and Eric O’Connor, finally for this collection, look back to the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Rome and the early years of its implementation to 
provide further examples of how domestic French preferences effectively limited 
alternative futures for the European Community (and by extension, today’s European 
Union).  Brown’s study of ‘Drawing Algeria into Europe’ tells the fascinating story of 
Eurafrique which never was: how the founding members of the EEC, at France’s 
request, were ready to draw the boundaries of Europe beyond the Mediterranean to 
incorporate French Algeria.  The account, drawing substantially on primary archival 
material, demonstrates how France’s domestic turmoil – the loss of Algeria and the 
fall of the Fourth Republic – brought about an early contraction of the territorial 
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reach of European integration, and set a course for how the EU would henceforth 
define its friends and neighbours: the momentum for EU-North African relations was 
never really regained, despite efforts along the way. The Eurafrique that never was, 
seen from today’s perspective, was perhaps a lost opportunity to prevent the 
problems and human tragedies posed by today’s ongoing flight of refugees from 
North Africa to the EU, and to which the EU still has little coherent answer.  
Brown’s article unpicks how France went about integrating l’Union francaise into the 
EEC as a key plank in its own françafrique strategy. Times had already moved on since 
the ECSC negotiations which did not include discussions of French Empire. As that 
empire crumbled further during the 1950s, so did France look to the European level 
for support in maintaining (for example via aid) what was left.  France’s sense of 
global mission at this time trumped concerns over national sovereignty: better 
Eurafrique than no Françafrique.  French demands were met, market access would 
over time be accorded to French overseas possessions, and Algeria was set to become 
the ‘most underdeveloped region of the European Community’. Free movement of 
labour was a sticking point, for example for Italians fearing north African cheap 
labour; but, nevertheless, the Treaty of Rome lay ‘the groundwork for an extension of 
Europe beyond the continent’ and Brown talks of the ‘long reach of the Treaty of 
Rome’, geographically-speaking.   
As Algeria started to escape from the French grip, the EC6 struggled to picture Algeria 
as a third party state: ‘how would an independent state located on the continent of 
Africa be connected to the EEC, and what legal and economic rights might this entail?’  
We note in passing that such questions are not irrevelant, in 2017, to the situation of 
the EU27 faced with Brexit. Ultimately, domestic French politics and the loss of 
Algeria meant that the Treaty plans for Algeria (Article 227) became redundant, but 
the influence of the negotiations over Eurafrique nevertheless skewed the EU’s 
development policies from the start: ‘In economic, political and geographical terms, 
Europe was never only on the continent. Indeed, its greatest advocates could not 
even agree where Europe ended and an African, Muslum or Arab world began’ (THIS 
ISSUE).  As such, the case of Algeria and Europe informs our understanding of 
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‘contemporary interrogations of Europe’s borders and citizenship regimes’ (THIS 
ISSUE).   
Eric O’Connor, in his article entitled ‘European Democracy Deferred: De Gaulle and 
the Dehousse Plan, 1960’, focuses on the period shortly after de Gaulle returned to 
power as President of the Fifth Republic.  The matter in question is the debate that 
emerged in 1960 over the activation of the Treaty of Rome’s Article 138 provisions for 
direct elections to the Assembly (the European Parliament as it subsequently became 
known).  In this account of the debate, two unequal protagonists – Renaud Dehousse 
for the Assembly, and Charles de Gaulle (by proxy) for the Council of Ministers – 
clashed over their competing visions of democracy. Dehousse had given his name to 
the Assembly’s report recommending the federalist-inspired move to transnational, 
direct elections to the Assembly; de Gaulle by 1960 had made clear his preference for 
plebiscitary democracy grounded in nations and their states. De Gaulle instructed his 
ministers to block the Assembly’s ‘Dehousse Plan’ and in doing so drained support 
within the Community of Six from the already minority idea of a federal European 
future.  In this regard, the Treaty of Rome was a casualty of having been ‘created in 
one era and implemented in another’ and it is hard to disagree with O’Connor’s 
conclusion that here too, we see the original Six store up ambiguity for future 
generations: this ‘stalemate’ over direct elections to the EP, argues O’Connor, 
‘perpetuated the original democratic design of European integration, in which 
democracy existed in shape and spirit, exemplified by a transnational parliament and 
its federalist representatives, but not in practice’.  Despite direct elections to the EP 
finally coming on stream in 1979 and despite subsequent transfers of power to the 
European Parliament in the EU’s political system, this tension between the spirit and 
the practice of democracy at the level of the EU continues to be prominently writ 
large not only in EU-level discussion, but writ nationally at the level of French politics, 
as shown by our collection of articles discussed above.  
In conclusion 
The Fourth Republic that signed the Treaty of Rome 60 years ago did become undone 
but not over Europe.  The Union française also become undone, again not because of 
Europe, and despite the EU5’s willingness in the ToR negotiations to extend ‘Europe’ 
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to North Africa to accommodate French demands.  The Fifth Republic inherited the 
1957 settlement of the EU6 and implemented it à sa guise: we saw above the 
blocking moves of General de Gaulle with relation to direct elections to the EP, by 
way of example.  But in the case of the Fifth Republic and sixty years on from the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome, it seems reasonable to ask the following question: by 
seeking not to become undone by the growing tensions of EU membership, perhaps 
contemporary France has fallen into the sort of transactionalist, cost-benefit 
relationship with the EU that we more readily associate with the United Kingdom’s 
‘conditional and differential engagement’ with the EU, and which made the UK 
vulnerable to its 2016 vote by referendum to withdraw from its 43-year membership 
(A. Geddes, 2013)?  Seen from this perspective, the significance of ‘Europe’ to the 
2017 French presidential elections becomes more obvious, and gives us a more 
realistic sense of the possible and probable outcomes from French policy towards 
Europe in the aftermath of those elections.  Sixty years on from the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, notions of ‘Frexit’ are both as far-fetched and as envisageable as was 
‘Brexit’ in 2013, on the 40th anniversary of the UK’s accession to the EEC.  
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